Remembering Captain Howard W. Crews

His name appears several times in the book.

The author says in the acknowledgments that he was his mentor introducing him to more veterans.

Howard Crews thus had survived the war and, without knowing, provided this picture which started this tribute to 39 pilots.

Eight more to go…

Brown

Southerland

Simpler

Richardson

Green

Jensen

Clarke

Stepanek, and the last one, Richard “Chick” Harmer.

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Remembering Lieutenant (junior grade) Elisha Terrill “Smokey” Stover (1920-1944)

Self-portrait of Smokey Stover 

This is self-portrait is featured in the book as well as his name which appears 99 times.


What happened to Smokey? It’s in a book.

The story of a Navy fighter pilot who was killed in the Pacific. This comes from his diary and letters.


Remembering Smokey…

Smokey’s name also appears here as a footnote…

Source

https://m.usni.org/magazines/navalhistory/2012-05/mitscher-and-mystery-midway

Mitscher and the Mystery of Midway

By Craig L. Symonds

Compelling evidence suggests the Hornet CO deliberately filed a misleading report after the puzzling ‘flight to nowhere’ in the Pacific war’s pivotal battle.

Just a handful of veterans of the Battle of Midway—virtually all of them now in their 90s—survive as we mark the 70th anniversary this summer of that stunning naval victory. The subject of scores of books and movies, the decisive showdown has been studied and debated exhaustively. Yet even seven decades on, some lingering questions continue to perplex historians.

Five years ago in these pages, Ronald Russell, webmaster of the Midway veterans’ online site (www.midway42.org) and author of the thoughtful and respected volume No Right to Win(iUniverse, 2006), noted the glaring discrepancies between Captain Marc “Pete” Mitscher’s official report on the battle—particularly the actions of the air squadrons of the USS Hornet (CV-8) on 4 June 1942—and the recollections of most of the pilots who flew off the Hornet that day.1 Russell wrote correctly that the discrepancies left students of the battle wondering about “what actually happened to all of those aviators on that epic day.” While it may be impossible at this remove to resolve the mystery with certainty, it is the purpose of this article to suggest a possible answer.

The origins of the puzzle stretch back to the commissioning of the new-construction Hornet in March 1942. The newest American carrier, the Hornet did not even have sufficient time to qualify most of her pilots as she steamed south from Norfolk, Virginia, to the Panama Canal, then up the U.S. West Coast to Alameda, California. There the planes of her air group were struck below to the hangar deck, so she could take aboard 16 Mitchell B-25 bombers for an Army Air Forces raid on Tokyo led by Lieutenant Colonel “Jimmy” Doolittle. Naturally, pilot training had to be suspended while the Hornet was thus encumbered, and only after Doolittle and his fellow pilots took off did the Hornet resume normal carrier operations. Given that timetable, the Hornet had not been able to participate in any of the early American raids against Japanese outposts in the Marshall Islands and elsewhere. The Battle of Midway was therefore her first action against an enemy force.

On 28 May 1942, the Hornet left Pearl Harbor in company with her sister ship, the Enterprise (CV-6), for a rendezvous nearly 1,500 miles to the north, a location optimistically code-named Point Luck. Cryptanalysts under Commander Joseph Rochefort, working in the dark, air-conditioned basement of the 14th Naval District headquarters in Honolulu, had determined that the Japanese were embarking on a major operation to seize the two-island atoll of Midway, and Admiral Chester Nimitz had decided to send his carrier force there in the hope of springing an ambush.

An Incorrect Assumption

The crucial role of the code-breakers in the Battle of Midway is well known—often even overstated. Some students of the battle have asserted that Rochefort and his colleagues were able to provide Nimitz and the other senior American planners with a copy of the Japanese order of battle. That, however, was not the case, which is particularly important in assessing the role of theHornet air group in the subsequent battle. While Nimitz did know that the Japanese were sending four carriers—plus supports and escorts—to attack Midway, the available intelligence did not tell him how the Japanese would deploy those four carriers—a point to bear in mind. We know now, of course, that all four ships operated together as a single task force—the Mobile Striking Force, or Kido Butai. But at the time, Nimitz and the other key decision-makers assumed that the Japanese would operate their four carriers in two separate groups.2

The source of that assumption is unclear, but it may well be something as simple as a case of mirror-imaging: The United States operated its three carriers in two task forces (TF 16 and TF 17), so it perhaps seemed quite likely to the Americans that the Japanese would do the same. Evidence of this assumption is in Nimitz’s initial orders to the task-force commanders and the commanders on Midway. In those orders, Nimitz suggested that “one or more [of the enemy] carriers may take up close-in daylight positions” for the attack on Midway, while “additional carrier groups” operated against American surface forces. In the briefing that Mitscher’s intelligence officer, Lieutenant Stephen Jurika, gave to the pilots on board the Hornet the night before the battle, Jurika told them “there were at least two carriers, two battleships, several cruisers and about five destroyers in the attack force which would attempt to take Midway” and that “the support force some distance behind contained the rest of their forces.”3

Those assumptions were reinforced at 0603 on 4 June when a PBY Catalina out of Midway reported the first sighting of the enemy: two carriers and two battleships, 180 miles north of the atoll. Two carriers! Where were the others? Forty-five minutes later, Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, the senior American officer afloat, sent a message (which Mitscher monitored) to the commander of TF 16, Rear Admiral Raymond Spruance, to remind him: “Two carriers [are] unaccounted for.”4 It is important to remember those assumptions in considering what happened next.

A Curious Lack of Documents

At 0705, the Hornet and Enterprise began launching aircraft. TheYorktown (CV-5)—the third U.S. carrier at Point Luck—held her strike force back to await further news, presumably information about those “missing” two carriers. By 0800 all the planes from the Enterprise and Hornet were aloft. The Enterprise planes flew to the southwest on a bearing of approximately 239 degrees True, toward the coordinates sent in by the PBY two hours earlier.

But what about the Hornet’s planes? Which way did they go? That turns out to be a complicated question.

For starters, there is a gaping hole in the official record concerning the activities of the Hornet’s air group on 4 June. Though all unit commanders were required to submit official written reports after each action, there is only one official report from the Hornet, written by—or at least signed by—Pete Mitscher. Stamped “Secret” and dated 13 June 1942, it is sufficiently detailed in its description of events, but it is not accompanied by a group commander’s report or reports from any of the squadron commanders. The absence of a report from the torpedo squadron (VT-8) is easily explained: Torpedo Eight from the Hornet was wiped out in its attack on the Kido Butai that morning; only one pilot survived, Ensign George Gay. Though he was debriefed, and much later wrote a personal memoir, Gay never wrote an after-action report. There is no explanation, however, for the absence of reports from any of the three other squadrons.

In the one report that does exist—Mitscher’s—he asserts that “The objective, enemy carriers, was calculated to be 155 miles distant, bearing 239° T[rue] from this Task Force; one division of 10 VF [fighters], Squadron Commander in charge, was sent with 35 VSB [bombers] and 15 VTB [torpedo planes].” It is noteworthy that Mitscher uses the passive voice: The range and course bearing “was calculated”—by whom he does not say. Similarly, the strike force “was sent” and while he does not specifically say that it was sent on that bearing of 239 degrees, that is certainly implied. (Of course, passive voice was—and is—common in Navy parlance. Even today, officers do not make requests, instead their chits read: “It is requested that. . .”—as if the request existed independently of the author.)

Mitscher’s 13 June report continues: “They [the pilots] were unable to locate the enemy and landed on board at 1727.” Mitscher explains this by noting “about one hour after the planes had departed the enemy reversed his course and started his retirement.” And it is true that the Kido Butai turned from the southeast to the northeast at 0917 that day. As a result of that turn, Mitscher writes, the American pilots failed to spot the enemy and eventually returned to the carrier—those who could. Mitscher even included a map in his official report showing the air group flying on the 239-degrees-True course and missing the Japanese carriers because they had turned north.5

(Most) Pilots Tell a Different Story

For more than 50 years, students of the Battle of Midway took Mitscher at his word and described the Hornet air group as missing the Japanese because the American planes flew south of the target. But, as Ronald Russell noted in his February 2006 article, unofficial evidence, mainly from postbattle interviews, memoirs, letters, and other such sources, mostly (though not exclusively) indicate that the Hornet air group had not flown to the southwest on a course of 239, but to the west—on a course of 265 degrees.

That evidence comes mostly from the pilots themselves, who, in postwar oral interviews recalled that they had flown “westerly,” as one put it, “almost due west,” according to another, or more precisely (from yet another), “at 265 degrees.” When one pilot, Troy Guillory, initially said that the air group flew “westerly,” his interviewer suggested that he must be mistaken, that the course was to the southwest, at 239 degrees. No, said Guillory. “We went the wrong way to start with”—and pointing to the chart—“to the 265 line.” Ensign Ben Tappan stated simply, “We were going west.” The commander of the Hornet’s scouting squadron (VS-8), Lieutenant Commander (later Rear Admiral) Walt Rodee bluntly said, “We took the bearing and the course they gave us. It was about 265. . . . It was almost due west.” Rodee did not file an after-action report, but he did make note of the course in his flight log—which he kept. Finally, the radar operator on board the Hornet recalled tracking the air group as it flew away from TF 16, and said that as far as the CXAM radar could track the air group, it had flown outbound on a course of 265 degrees. Significantly, not all the pilots agreed. Ensign Clayton Fisher, who flew as wingman for the group commander on 4 June, claimed until his death in January 2012 that the air group flew southwest on a bearing between 235 and 240 degrees.6

Explaining the discrepancy between Mitscher’s report and the pilots’ memories is difficult. The absence of any squadron reports from the Hornet is by itself suspicious and encourages the conclusion that Mitscher’s official report may well be in error. Not surprisingly, Spruance thought so, too. In his own report on the battle, he wrote, “Where discrepancies exist between Enterprise and Hornet reports, the Enterprise report should be taken as more accurate.” That is an astonishing statement to make in an official report, and comes close to asserting that Mitscher’s report was not to be trusted.7

A Calculated Risk

To try to resolve this mystery, it is essential to re-examine what the Americans knew—or thought they knew—about Japanese intentions that day. Remember that most of the high command—including Mitscher—believed the Japanese were operating in two carrier groups: the one that had been sighted, and a second one, which was presumed to be operating 80 to 100 miles to the rear. Mitscher knew that the planes from the Enterprise were going after the two carriers that the PBY had sighted and reported, and he may have harbored fears that even if that strike were successful the other two enemy carriers would remain untouched—and more important, that the element of surprise would be lost.

Pete Mitscher was the most senior U.S. Navy aviation officer afloat that day. Rear Admiral Bill Halsey, an aviator who was supposed to have commanded at Midway, was in the hospital. Captain George Murray, commander of the Enterprise, was Naval Aviator No. 22, and Spruance had designated him as tactical air officer for the strike. But Mitscher, who was Naval Aviator No. 33, had been selected for promotion to rear admiral, and his staff already was referring to him as “Admiral Mitscher.” In Halsey’s absence, Fletcher was the senior officer afloat, but neither he nor Spruance were aviators. It is easy to imagine that, in Mitscher’s mind, it was up to him to ensure the proper coordination of the air strikes.

Mitscher knew there would be only one chance to effect surprise, and that once surprise was lost, the battle would become a toss-up. If the Enterprise planes succeeded in surprising and sinking the two enemy flattops at the known coordinates, it is entirely reasonable to assume that Mitscher may have calculated the best use of the Hornet’s air group was to find and sink the two carriers that had not yet been sighted—but which presumably were operating 80 to 100 miles behind the other Japanese ships. In consideration of those factors, Mitscher may have told his air group leader, Commander Stanhope Ring, to take the entire air group to a position 80 miles behind the leading Japanese carriers. If one calculates that bearing from the Hornet’s position that morning, it turns out to be about 265 degrees.

If that is what happened, Mitscher apparently did not share the revised objective with any of the four squadron commanders—just with group commander Ring. That would explain why the commander of Torpedo Eight, Lieutenant Commander John Waldron, was so surprised—and then angry—when he was told the course he was to fly. He knew that a course of 265 would not lead them to the coordinates he had carefully plotted in the ready room that morning based on the location of the sighted Japanese carriers.

Broken Silence, Angry Words, and a Breakup

There are no official transcripts of the radio chatter that morning because everyone was supposed to be observing radio silence. The objective, after all, was surprise. But years later, many of the air-group pilots recalled what they heard being transmitted, and their memories are revealing.

After the Hornet’s planes launched between 0700 and 0755 that morning, the bombers and fighters climbed to 20,000 feet while the torpedo planes flew almost three vertical miles below them at 1,500 feet. Though they all flew under radio silence, only about 15 minutes into the mission several of the pilots remembered John Waldron’s voice coming through their headsets: “You’re going the wrong direction for the Japanese carrier force.” Ring was furious that Waldron had broken radio silence, and equally furious to be challenged on an open radio net—in effect, in front of the entire command. The next voice on the air was Ring: “I’m leading this flight,” he snapped. “You fly with us right here.” Waldron was not intimidated. “I know where the damned Jap fleet is,” he insisted. Ring, even angrier, barked back: “You fly on us! I’m leading this formation; you fly on us.” There was a brief silence before a final rejoinder came from Waldron: “Well, the hell with you. I know where they are and I’m going to them.” Three miles below Ring, Waldron banked his plane to the left, heading southwest. His entire squadron went with him.8

History tells us, of course, that Waldron was right. He did know where “the damned Jap fleet” was. And when he found it, his squadron was annihilated in a futile and hopeless attack against overwhelming odds. But meantime, what was happening with the rest of the Hornet air group? A half hour after Waldron departed, the Wildcat fighters accompanying the strike force began to run low on fuel and they, too, abandoned the mission, flying back toward the Hornet on a reciprocal course. None made it, for they had waited too long and failed to find the task force. All of them ran out of fuel and ditched in the ocean. Two pilots lost their lives.

Soon after the departure of the fighters, some pilots in the bombing squadron (VB-8) recalled hearing another broadcast from Waldron: “Stanhope from Johnny One. Stanhope from Johnny One.” There was no reply, but there were more messages from Waldron: “Watch those fighters!” and “My two wing men are going in the water.”9 It was evident now that Waldron had indeed found the Kido Butai. Soon after that, the planes from the Hornet’s bomber squadron, led by their CO, Lieutenant Commander Ruff Johnson, peeled off from the formation and turned south. Ring broke radio silence in an attempt to recall them, but they continued on, partly to look for the Japanese, partly to see if they could make it to Midway’s airfield because Johnson doubted that his pilots had enough fuel left to make it all the way back to the Hornet. Eleven of them eventually landed on Midway; three went into the water out of fuel; and three managed to reach the Hornet.

Ring continued to fly west, now with just the scout bombers still in company. At 225 miles out—nearly 100 miles beyond the calculated range to the target—the scout bombers, too, left, low on fuel. Astonishingly, for a few brief moments Ring flew on by himself. Very soon, however, he gave up and turned. He flew back toward the Hornet completely alone—abandoned by his entire command. In the day’s final tally, just 20 of the 59 airplanes that took off from Hornet that morning returned. Not one of them had dropped a bomb on an enemy ship.

The Case for Fudging an After-Action Report

The episode has gone down in the history of the Battle of Midway as “the flight to nowhere.” As Mitscher noted laconically in his official report, “None of Scouting Eight or Bombing Eight made contact with the enemy.” That much of Mitscher’s report, at least, is true enough. But if the recollections of the pilots are accurate, much of the rest of his report is not. So we are still left with the puzzle of why Mitscher recounted a dramatically different story in his report.10 It can’t be known for certain, but a very plausible explanation is that three considerations influenced Mitscher.

First, by the time Mitscher sat down to write that report nine days later, he knew that all four Japanese carriers had been operating as a unit, so that if he had, in fact, made an independent decision to send the entire air group to look for two of them elsewhere, that decision would now be revealed as—at the least—unwise. Second, by then Mitscher also knew most of the details of the several mutinous actions of the squadron commanders who, one by one, had defied orders and abandoned the group commander. If all that were reported officially, Mitscher would almost certainly have to file court-martial papers against each of them. Disobeying orders during a war patrol, after all, is mutiny.

Finally (and this may have been decisive) by 13 June when Mitscher wrote his report, it was very clear that the Americans had won an overwhelming victory at Midway—indeed, the greatest triumph in U.S. naval history. It simply would not do, then, to sully that achievement with a raft of posthumous courts-martial against men such as Waldron. So instead of filing mutiny charges, Mitscher wrote this: “Torpedo Eight, led by Lieutenant Commander John C. Waldron, U.S.N., was lost in its entirety. This squadron flew at 100 knots below the clouds while the remainder of the group flew at 110 knots climbing to 19,000 feet. Lieutenant Commander Waldron, a highly aggressive officer, leading a well-trained squadron, found his target and attacked. . . . This squadron is deserving of the highest honors for finding the enemy, pressing home its attack, without fighter protection and without diverting dive bomber attacks to draw the enemy fire.”11

So Waldron was not a mutineer—he was a hero. Mitscher may well have asked himself what was to be gained by submitting a report that attacked the memory of the martyred Waldron or filing court-martial papers against any of the other squadron commanders. So instead Mitscher recommended all of them for medals, told those squadron commanders who had survived not to file reports, and submitted what he knew to be a false report.

Is that what happened? The best answer a responsible historian can offer now, 70 years later, is “probably.” The historical quest is never-ending, however, and it is not impossible that one day additional material will come to light that will help explain further the enigma of the so-called flight to nowhere. In the meantime, how do we assess the actions and decisions of Marc Mitscher at Midway? Here was the man who, over the next three years, would command the Fast Carrier Task Force that led the American drive across the Pacific to Saipan, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, and became known as “The Magnificent Mitscher.” Should that assessment be modified based on the likelihood that he knowingly filed a false report about the Battle of Midway? Or given the circumstances of 13 June 1942, was his decision to gundeck the story of the flight to nowhere a reasonable one?

1. Ronald Russell, “Changing Course: The Hornet’s Air Group at Midway,” Naval History, February 2006, pp. 48–53.

2. For a discussion of this see Appendix E (pp. 387–88) in Craig L. Symonds, The Battle of Midway (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

3. Nimitz to Commander Striking Force, 28 May 1942, Action Reports microfilm, reel 3, p. 3. The passage from Jurika’s intelligence briefing is from the diary of E. T. “Smokey” Stover in Stover and Clark Reynolds, The Saga of Smokey Stover(Charleston, SC: Tradd Street Press, 1978), p. 29 (diary entry of 7 June).

4. Fletcher’s message to Spruance is in John B. Lundstrom,Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), p. 248.

5. Mitscher to Nimitz, 13 June 1942, Action Reports microfilm, reel 3. Also available atwww.history.navy.mil/docs/wwii/mid5.htm.

6. These interviews, conducted by Bowen Weisheit, are collected in the bound volume “The Battle of Midway: Transcripts of Recorded Interviews,” Nimitz Library, U.S. Naval Academy. Weisheit’s conclusions are in his book, The Last Flight of Ensign C. Markland Kelly, Jr. (Baltimore: Ensign C. Markland Kelly Memorial Foundation, 1993).

7. Spruance to Nimitz, 16 June 1942, Action Reports microfilm, reel 3. Also available at www.midway42.org/reports.html.

8. Weisheit’s interviews of Troy Guillory (14 March 1983) and Ben Tappen (1981), “Transcripts.” The last response from Waldron, as rendered here, is an amalgam of what Guillory and Tappen recalled.

9. Enclosure (H) to Hornet Serial 0018, dated 13 June 1942, by Leroy Quillen, radioman/gunner for Ensign K. B. White, in VB-8, Action Reports, reel 2. Quillen remembered the initial call as “Johnny One to Johnny Two,” but others recalled it as “Stanhope from Johnny One.”

10. Mitscher to Nimitz, 13 June 1942, op. cit.

11. Ibid.

©2015 U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE

Epilogue

http://www.militaryhallofhonor.com/honoree-record.php?id=164694

Biography:
 

Elisha Terrill Stover
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy

Elisha Terrill Stover was born on 9 February 1920 in Dallas, TX, the son of James Spurgeon and Stella Terrill Stover.

Lt Elisha Stover flew Wildcats off the USS Hornet (CV-8) at Midway, and wound up on Guadalcanal after Hornet was sunk at Santa Cruz in October 1942.

In 1943 a documentary was made about the brand newEssex-class carrier, USS Yorktown (CV-10). After his experiences on Guadalcanal, Stover returned home to become the naval aviator assigned to the new Combat Information Center (CIC) on the new Yorktown. Lt Stover is seen and introduced in this role in the documentary film “The Fighting Lady.”

Stover had begged all along to be returned to flying status and was eventually reassigned to Fighting 5 (VF-5), the Hellcat squadron in Yorktown’s Air Wing. A very popular officer, he was forced to bail out of his plane during the big strike on Truk on 16 February 1944. He was reported as Missing in Action, but was believed to have drifted ashore at this major Japanese base.

Postwar, it was learned that of seven downed US aviators who came ashore, all were beaten and tortured by their captors. Then, the day after the raids ceased, all were marched to the beach and beheaded with swords by the Japanese.Medals, Awards and Badges

Distinguished Flying Cross
Purple Heart
Air Medal
Combat Action Ribbon
Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal
World War II Victory Medal
Naval Aviator Badge

Distinguished Flying Cross Citation

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Distinguished Flying Cross to Lieutenant, Junior Grade Elisha T. Stover (NSN: 0-98475), United States Navy, for extraordinary achievement while participating in aerial flight as pilot of a fighter plane in action against Japanese forces during the Solomon Islands Campaign, 13 to 14 September 1942. Lieutenant, Junior Grade, Stover shot down three enemy planes while operating with his squadron from an airfield on Guadalcanal.

General Orders: Bureau of Naval Personnel Information Bulletin No. 315 (June 1943)

Death and Memorialization

Lieutenant Elisha Terrill ‘Smokey’ Stover was listed as Missing in Action on 16 February 1944. He is memorialized on the Tablets of the Missing at Manila American Cemetery and Memorial in Manila, Metro Manila, National Capital Region, Philippines. His remains were never recovered.

Origin of Nickname/Handle:
It is believed that he acquired the name ‘Smokey’ from a comic strip that began in 1935 with a character named “Smokey” Stover.

https://www.findagrave.com/cgi-bin/fg.cgi?page=gr&GRid=91563618

Remembering Lieutenant (junior grade) John M. Kleinman

I believe he survived the war.

John M. Kleinman flew also with Fighting Squadron 17.

His name appears 28 times in this book.

This is a most interesting excerpt…

By the end of January, we had two combat veterans aboard, Lt(jg) Johnny Kleinman and Lt(jg) Sunny Jim Halford. Both had served with carrier-based fighter squadrons early in the Pacific War and then, in September and October 1942, land-based at Guadalcanal’s Henderson Field. Unfortunately, their squadron, Fighting-5, had been right at the forefront -literally the first line of defense – during its tour at Guadalcanal, and the experience had been brutal.

Though Kleinman and Halford each had had ample home leave and time to recover, both proved to be a little shaky still when they reported aboard Fighting-17. In truth, neither was overjoyed with the prospect of going out again.

Six lieutenants joined us from various elimination bases, where they had been instructors at the most basic level of the Navy’s pilot entry program. They were all good pilots, but none had any combat experience nor even any time in high-performance airplanes. We got one more lieutenant, who, along with a passel of new ensigns, had only just completed advanced training. I was shocked to learn that none of the newly bewinged pilots…

Remembering Ensign Mark K. Bright (1919-1944)

1942 VF (5) Squadron Saratoga 3-27 Bright

BRIGHT, MARK K.
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S. Navy R
Fighting Squadron 5 (VF-5), U.S.S. Saratoga
Date of Action: August 7, 1942

Citation:

The Navy Cross is presented to Mark K. Bright, Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S. Navy, for extraordinary heroism and distinguished service in the line of his profession as Wingman, Fifth Division, Fighting Squadron Five, during the Guadalcanal-Tulagi action on August 7, 1942. Upon sighting an enemy force of eleven dive bombers about to enter upon a diving attack against transports and other surface vessels, Lieutenant (j.g.) Bright played an important role in an attack upon them which resulted in the destruction of nine of them, thereby breaking up the enemy attack and preventing the enemy from registering any hits upon their targets. He personally shot down two of the enemy bombers, one of them while in its dive before its bombs had been released. He also assisted in destroying two other planes which crashed under the combined fire of his guns and those of other friendly pilots. His conduct throughout was in keeping with the highest traditions of the Naval Service.

CinC Pac Serial 28 (1943)
Birth: 2/8/1919 – Lodi, CA
Home Town: Anderson, IN

 

Source: http://archive.li/R7IuF#selection-8019.1-8045.24


Footnote

During the morning of 17 June 1944, Lt Mark K. Bright, an F4F and F6F ace (9 kills) serving with VF-16, is killed by antiaircraft fire while attacking ground targets at Guam/Agana Airdome.

Remembering Ensign Foster J “Crud” Blair (1920-1969)

1942 VF (5) Squadron Saratoga 3-26 Blair

Blair’s name appears many times in the book. The author used his diary to document his book.

book

Ensign Foster J “Crud” Blair survived the war, and we even know how he got his nickname.


From the Hall of Valor Website

Foster John Blair
Date of birth: April 13, 1920
Date of death: July 27, 1969
Burial location: Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania
Place of Birth: Pennsylvania, Sciota
Home of record: Stroudsburg Pennsylvania

Foster Blair was credited with shooting down 2.33 enemy aircraft in aerial combat during World War II.
AWARDS AND CITATIONS

See more recipients of this award

Awarded for actions during the World War II

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Silver Star to Lieutenant, Junior Grade [then Ensign] Foster J. Blair, United States Naval Reserve, for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity with the enemy while his squadron has been based at Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands. Ensign Blair his distinguished himself heroically in aerial combat with complete disregard for personal safety while shooting down two enemy bombers in action occurring over Guadalcanal on 28 September 1942. His gallant actions and dedicated devotion to duty, without regard for his own life, were in keeping with the highest traditions of military service and reflect great credit upon himself and the United States Naval Service.

Action Date: September 28, 1942

Service: Navy

Battalion: Fighting Squadron 3 (VF-3)


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Foster Blair was born on April 13, 1920, in Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania. He enlisted in the Naval Aviation Cadet Program on February 26, 1941, and was commissioned an Ensign in the U.S. Navy and designated a Naval Aviator at NAS Miami, Florida, on October 14, 1941. His first assignment was as an F4F Wildcat pilot with VF-5 aboard the aircraft carrier USS Saratoga (CV-3) from November 1941 to December 1942, and during this time he was officially credited with the destruction of 2 enemy aircraft in aerial combat, plus 1 damaged; although he claimed the destruction of 4. After serving with VF-3 from January to April 1943, LtJg Blair served as an F6F Hellcat pilot with VC-21 aboard the aircraft carrier USS Nassau (CVE-16) from April to June 1943. His next assignment was as an F6F pilot with VF-6 aboard the aircraft carrier USS Independence (CVL-22) from June to November 1943, and during this time he claimed another enemy aircraft destroyed in the air, although he was only officially given credit for 0.333 of the victory. This gave him a total claimed of 5 during World War II, but he was only officially given credit for 2.333 air victories with 1 damaged. LT Blair served with VC-39 aboard the aircraft carrier USS Liscome Bay (CVE-56) in November 1943; having landed on another aircraft carrier when his ship was sunk by a Japanese submarine on November 23, 1943. He next served as a flight instructor at NAS Sanford, Florida, from January 1944 to June 1945, followed by service as an Air Coordinator with the Pacific Fleet from June to November 1945. LCDR Blair served in the U.S. Navy Reserve from July 1946 to July 1953, and during this time he served as Executive Officer of VF-79A at NAS Willow Grove, Pennsylvania, as Executive Officer of Fleet Air Service Squadron 832 (FASRON-832) at NAS New York, as Officer in Charge of RTU-1 at NAS Willow Grove, and then as Assistant Officer in Charge of BTU-1N at NAAS Whiting Field, Florida. He returned to active duty in the Navy in July 1953, and attended helicopter pilot training at NAAS Ellyson Field, Florida, from July to September 1953. He served a brief tour on the General Court Martial Board from September to November 1953, and then served as a helicopter pilot and as Operations Officer of HU-2 at NAS Lakehurst, New Jersey, from November 1953 to March 1956. During this time he deployed aboard the battleship USS Iowa (BB-61) from May to August 1955. CDR Blair served at NAS MFS, Millington, Tennessee, from March 1956 to January 1959, and then at Naval Station Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, from January 1959 to June 1962. His next assignment was at Naval Station Rota, Spain, from June 1962 to May 1964, followed by service with the Inspector of Naval Materials on Long Island, New York, from May 1964 to November 1965. His final assignment was at Headquarters 3rd Naval District in New York City from November 1965 until his retirement from the Navy on June 30, 1966. Foster Blair died on June 27, 1969, and was buried at the Laurelwood Cemetery in Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania.

His Silver Star Citation reads:

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity with the enemy while his squadron has been based at Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands. Ensign Blair his distinguished himself heroically in aerial combat with complete disregard for personal safety while shooting down two enemy bombers in action occurring over Guadalcanal on 28 September 1942.


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Remembering Ensign Horace Ancel Bass Junior (1915-1942)

1942 VF (5) Squadron Saratoga 3-25 BassBass was born in Roanoke, Virginia on 22 September 1915, and enlisted in the U.S. Navy on 24 February 1941. In May 1941 he was designated “aviation cadet”, and after aviation training was appointed ensign on 5 December 1941. Bass underwent further flight training and reported to aircraft carrier USS Saratoga (CV-3) in early 1942.
Assigned to aircraft carrier USS Yorktown (CV-5) during the pivotal Battle of Midway, he flew as part of the combat air patrol on 4 June 1942, and, although his plane was damaged, shot down an attacking Japanese dive bomber and a fighter. For his important part in the battle Bass was awarded the Navy Cross.
Assigned to Fighting Squadron 5 on board Saratoga, Bass again flew in the combat air patrol during the Battle of the Eastern Solomons of 23–25 August 1942. As he and his fellow pilots protected Saratoga, Bass was shot down and reported missing in action. He was presumed dead on 24 August 1942.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Horace_A._Bass_Jr.

A ship was named after him.

811-Horace-A-Bass-80-G-1078466

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Horace_A._Bass_(APD-124)


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Remembering Ensign Leon W. Haynes

1942 VF (5) Squadron Saratoga 3-21

About the time Thatch and Sellstrom were landing on Lexington, Gill’s radar operators reported another suspected snooper to the north. This time LT Gill selected the two-plane “Orange Section” of LTJG Onia B. Stanley and ENS Leon W. Haynes to check out the intruder. To illustrate the terse and compact fighter direction vocabulary, the entire vector order was as follows, “Orange Section from Romeo—Vector three four three—Buster—Angels six.” Orange Section has already been explained, and “Romeo” was Gill’s call sign. The rest meant take a heading of magnetic 343 degrees at maximum sustained power at an altitude of 6,000 feet. The only higher power setting would be “Gate” meaning full military power, which could only be used for a short time without engine damage. They proceeded out about twenty miles when ENS Haynes spotted another “BIG” silver four-engine flying boat, which apparently also spotted the two fighters because it immediately jettisoned its bombs to gain flying speed. LTJG Stanley tallyhoed back to Gill, and the two fighters set up their attack while sparkling flashes and tracers coming from their intended target showed that gunners with twenty mm cannons on the big boat were seeking their range. On their first pass Stanley’s four fifty caliber machine guns failed to fire, but Haynes had the satisfaction of putting the tail cannon out of action. In the meantime Stanley realized he had not flipped on the gun master arm switch because it was located in a different position than in the Wildcat he usually flew. In the next pass his guns worked and he could see his tracers penetrating through the wing and in to the cockpit. The engine area of the wing was soon a sheet of fire and gray smoke, and the huge craft went into a steep dive that ended up as a circle of flame on the ocean’s surface. The task force could also see the smoke of the second burning Kawanishi. [33, pp.93-94]

Source: http://ethw.org/The_CXAM_Goes_to_War_-_Chapter_6_of_Radar_and_the_Fighter_Directors

Pilots_of_US_Navy_Fighting_Squadron_3_(VF-3)_on_5_March_1942

The pilots of the U.S. Navy Fighting Squadron 3 (VF-3) in front of a Grumman F4F-3 Wildcat fighter, 5 March 1942.

Standing (l-r): Newton H. Mason, Howard F. Clark, Edward R. Sellstrom, Willard E. Eder, Howard L. Johnson, John H. Lackey, Leon W. Haynes, Onia B. Stanley, Jr., Dale W. Peterson, Marion W. Dufilho, Rolla S. Lemmon.

Sitting (l-r): Robert J. Morgan, Albert O. Vorse, Jr., Donald A. Lovelace, John S. “Jimmy” Thach, Noel A.M. Gayler, Edward H. “Butch” O’Hare, Richard M. Rowell.


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